For example, if a professor wants to copy three pages from a 300-hundread-page E-book for a classroom use, this is an unarguable fair use. But if this E-book is encrypted by the publisher and can only be read on a handheld E-book reader which does not allow copy or print, the professor is not able to copy these pages unless he decrypts the access control of E-book, reads it from a computer, then circumvents the copying control. However, the professor cannot defend his right of copying the three pages because the decryption of access control is deemed illegal under the DMCA.

Lipinski (2003) provides an excellent analogy:

The DMCA does not define such an easement because the circumvention tools are prohibited. Although there are exceptions for research and education purposes (together with other purposes), what remains unanswered is how a user can obtain the means to circumvent if the selling of equipment is prohibited under the ban on infringing devices (Lutzker, 1999). Without an easement (a way to circumvent access control) in copyright law, it can be very difficult for a user to make fair use of a copyrighted work, even when the use is protected by the law.

As Burk (2002) pointed out, the DMCA actually confers copyright holders a separate set of rights, which are quite distinct from traditional copyright in the print world. These new rights are expansive and unprecedented. They confer upon content owners a new exclusive right to control not only access to technologically protected works, but also to control ancillary technologies related to content protection (Burk). The following case of United States v. Sklyarov can illustrate this point.

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